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The use of faith-based agencies to meet societal needs is the
hot topic in public policy circles. SenatorJohn Ashcroft's "Chari-
table Choice" amendment to the 1996 Welfare Reform bill
passed by Congress, his 1998 amendment that extended "Chari-
table Choice" to the Community Block Grant Program, and Sen-
ator Dan Coats' "Project for American Renewal" all seek to use
faith-based agencies in a renewed, but decentralized, de-
bureaucratized struggle against besetting the social ills of pov-
erty, drug-abuse, homelessness, teenage pregnancies, and more.'
The Clinton administration has also spoken favorably of using
faith-based agencies in the fight against social ills. The New Yorker
recently ran an article by Joe Klein highlighting the effective
work many faith-based agencies are doing in meeting pressing
social needs.2 The Brookings Institution devoted almost an
entire issue to the question of the role that private institutions of
civil society can play in meeting societal needs, and later pub-
lished that issue in expanded, book form.' Outside the Beltway,
Governor George Bush of Texas in 1996 created a Task Force on
Faith-Based Programs,4 and Governor John Engler of Michigan
has touted the effectiveness of faith-based agencies in meeting
basic needs of persons on welfare.5
* Social Science Division, Pepperdine University.
1. On Charitable Choice, see CENTER FOR PUB. JUSTICE & CENTER FOR LAW
& RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE: THE RULES OF SECTION
104 OF THE 1996 FEDERAL WELFARE LAW GOVERNING STATE COOPERATON WITH
FAITH-BASED SOCIAL-SERVICE PROVIDERS (1997). See also DAN COATS, PROJECT FOR
AMERICAN RENEWAL.
2. Joe Klein, In God They Trust, NEW YORKER, June 16, 1997, at 40.
3. See BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997; BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE REVVAL
OF CIVIL SOcIETv IN AMERICA (E.J. Dionne, Jr. ed., 1998).
4. See the report of this task force: GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON
FAITH-BASED COMMUNITY SERVICE GROUPS, STATE OF TEXAS, FAITH IN ACTION: A
NEW VISION FOR CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION IN TEXAS (1996).
5. See the report on the success of a church-based initiative in a county in
the western part of Michigan in Dan Coats & Spencer Abraham, Liberalism's
Mean Streets: How Conservatives Can Reverse Urban Decline, POLICY REVIEW, July-
Aug. 1998, at 36.
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What is sometimes missed in this flurry of interest in using
faith-based organizations to deliver public services is the fact that
throughout American history there has been a lively, continuing
partnership between government and nonprofit service organiza-
tions, including faith-based ones. Lester Salamon of Johns Hop-
kins University has noted, "Government support of voluntary
organizations has roots deep in American history. Well before
the American Revolution, for example, colonial governments
had established a tradition of assistance to private educational
institutions, and this tradition persisted into the nineteenth cen-
tury."6 One scholar has reported that in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, government "subsidies became the prevail-
ing method of financing most voluntary institutions."7 This gov-
ernment-nonprofit sector partnership has always included
religiously based agencies as well as their secular counterparts.
This pattern continues today. In 1993, 65 percent of Catholic
Charities' revenues came from government sources, as did 75
percent of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services'
revenues, and 55 percent of Lutheran Social Ministries' reve-
nues.8 In 1996, Catholic Relief Services received $128 million
from the government, World Vision Relief and Development, a
conservative Protestant agency, received $38 million, and Advent-
ist Development and Relief Agency International received $37
million.9
In spite of the long-standing government-religious service
agency partnership, and in spite of the renewed emphasis it is
receiving today, the constitutional terms and conditions under
which it exists have never been fully clarified. With American
public policy launching into a renewed emphasis on making use
of faith-based service agencies to deliver important public serv
ices, it is imperative to resolve certain key church-state uncertain-
ties, both for the sake of the agencies and for the success of the
new policy.
6. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of
Government Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 100 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987).
7. RALPH M. KRAMER, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN THE WELFARE STATE 61
(1981).
8. On the first two of these organizations, see Sean Mehegan, The Federal
Connection: Nonprofits are Looking More and More to Washington, NONPROFIT TIMES,
Nov. 1994, at 43. On the third of these organizations see DIVISION OF CHURCH
& SOC'Y OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT (1996).
9. OFFICE OF PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY COOPERATION, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INT'L DEv., VOLUNTARY FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS, 84-105 (1998).
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There are two lines of legal reasoning that have supported
public funds flowing to faith-based organizations providing
health, educational, and welfare services to the public. One is
that public funds may flow to faith-based institutions as long as
(1) they reach those institutions indirectly, not by way of the
decision of government officials, but by way of the decision of
individuals who have received some government benefit, and (2)
the public funds are neutrally available to an entire class of insti-
tutions, religious and non-religious alike. This line of reasoning
is illustrated by cases such as Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District, 10 Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,1 1
and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.12 It
has never, however, been applied by the Supreme Court to
instances where public funds were going directly to the faith-
based organization by decision of the government. In such
instances, the Court has relied on another, competing line of
reasoning: the sacred-secular distinction, a distinction made pos-
sible by the recipient agencies not being pervasively sectarian.
This line of reasoning accepts the no-funding-of-religion princi-
ple and argues that if the religious and secular aspects of the
programs of an agency can be separated, then the government is
free to fund the secular aspects. But this separation is only possi-
ble if the agency is not pervasively sectarian. In four decisions,
the Supreme Court has, on this basis, approved funding for faith-
based colleges and universities and the direct funding of a faith-
based agency working to discourage teen pregnancies.13 Mean-
while, the Supreme Court has-in a well-known line of deci-
sions-rejected almost all forms of subsidy for faith-based
elementary and secondary schools, holding that they are perva-
sively sectarian."
But how does one distinguish between a pervasively sectar-
ian institution and one that is not? Justice Lewis Powell, in the
majority opinion in Hunt v. McNair, indicated an institution is
pervasively sectarian when "religion is so pervasive that a substan-
10. 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding constitutional the provision of an
interpreter for a deaf student attending a religiously based high school).
11. 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (requiring a vocational rehabilitation program to
fund the education of a blind student studying for the ministry at a religious
college).
12. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (allowing university funding of a religious
student publication, with the funds going directly to the printer).
13. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
14. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1984); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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tial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission
[of the institution] ."15 Justice Harry Blackman, in Roemer v. Board
of Public Works, listed six characteristics of the four Catholic col-
leges whose receipt of public funds were being challenged in that
case that persuaded him they were not pervasively sectarian, and
were therefore eligible to receive public funds. The characteris-
tics were (1) the colleges were institutionally autonomous (they
were neither controlled by the church nor did they receive funds
from it), (2) religious indoctrination was not common (there
were no required religious exercises and spiritual development
was not a goal of the colleges), (3) academic freedom prevailed,
(4) normal academic standards were met (prayers at the begin-
ning of some classes and religious symbols did not mean normal
academic standards were not being met), (5) religion was not
taken into account in hiring faculty, and (6) religion was not
taken into account in admitting students.1 6 In School District v.
Ball, Justice William Brennan, in a footnote, attempted to distin-
guish the K-12 schools whose receipt of aid was found unconstitu-
tional in that case from colleges and universities whose receipt of
aid in other cases had been found constitutional:
The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ
substantially from the colleges that we refused to character-
ize as "pervasively sectarian" .. .. Many of the schools in
this case include prayer and attendance at religious serv-
ices as a part of their curriculum, are run by churches or
other organizations whose members must subscribe to par-
ticular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies
composed largely of adherents of the particular denomina-
tion, and give preference in attendance to children
belonging to the denomination.
1 7
In summary, the Supreme Court seems to be saying that a faith-
based organization is pervasively sectarian-and therefore consti-
tutionally unable to receive direct public funds-when religion
permeates the organization and all its programs, but it is less
clear on exactly what to look for in determining whether or not
that point has been reached. Questions such as formal institu-
tional autonomy, the presence or absence of religious indoctrina-
tion, the meeting of normal academic standards, and whether or
not religious criteria enter into selecting staff and clients or stu-
dents are relevant, but any one or combination of such factors
are not necessarily determinative. More on this shortly.
15. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (1973).
16. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-59 (1976).
17. 473 U.S. at 384 n.6 (1985).
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The basic thesis of this essay is that the sacred-secular distinc-
tion, combined with the pervasively sectarian standard, is an
uncertain, wavering standard that in practice is applied in a spo-
radic, inconsistent manner, and is less satisfactory than the com-
peting neutrality standard, which should be followed whether the
funding is direct or indirect. I develop this thesis, first, by report-
ing on a recent study of mine of faith-based organizations and
their receipt of funds under the pervasively sectarian standard. I
argue my study helps demonstrate the arbitrary, uncertain nature
of that standard and its application. Next, I present a case study
of the uncertainties and unfariness of the pervasively sectarian
standard, and then I argue that if the pervasively sectarian stan-
dard were ever broadly defined and strictly enforced, it would
lead to the wholesale violation of governmental neutrality. In the
conclusion, I argue that the Supreme Court ought to abandon its
direct funding principle and pervasively sectarian distinction
and, instead, judge programs of direct government funding of
faith-based agencies on neutrality grounds, as it now does in
cases of indirect funding programs.
II. THE PERVASIVELY SECTARIAN STANDARD IN PRACTICE
In 1993-94, I conducted a large national survey of three
types of religiously-based agencies and their receipt of public
money: family and child service agencies, international aid and
relief agencies, and colleges and universities."l I developed and
mailed out 1,606 questionnaires to nationwide lists of the heads
of the three types of organizations, and received back a total of
766 completed questionnaires, for a return rate of 48 percent.19
I supplemented the questionnaire results with numerous per-
sonal and telephone interviews.2 0
In spite of the Supreme Court's sometimes ringing words
holding aid to religious organizations unconstitutional, 2' the ear-
lier-noted pattern of government dollars flowing to faith-based
organizations was reconfirmed by the results of my study. Table I
shows the three types of organizations studied divided into those
that reported they were religiously based, those that said they
once were religiously based and now are largely secular in
18. I report much more fully on the results of this study in STEPHEN V.
MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY (1996).
19. See id. at 217-18.
20. Id.
21. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called .... ").
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nature, and those that indicated they have always been secular in
nature. Then it shows the percentages of their budgets that they
reported came from public funds. The most significant finding
is that in the case of all three types of agencies and all three types
of faith orientations (with only one exception), most of the agen-
cies reported receiving public funds. This held true whether or
not the agencies were religiously based. Among the child and
family service agencies, a majority of the faith-based agencies
reported receiving over 40 percent of their budgets from govern-
ment sources. The faith-based colleges and international aid
agencies reported that smaller amounts of their budgets came
from government sources, but the vast majority reported receiv-
ing some government funding.
One might suppose that the receipt of public funds would
vary by religious tradition. After all, elementary and secondary
schools within the Catholic and evangelical or conservative Prot-
estant traditions have been denied most forms of public funds by
Supreme Court First Amendment interpretations. Thus, one
might suppose that their other educational, health, and social
welfare organizations might also fare poorly in obtaining public
funds, and that the more mainstream, less controversial, main-
line Protestant and Jewish organizations would fare better. But
Table II shows that this is not the case. The conservative Protes-
tant and Catholic institutions fared as well or better at obtaining
public funds than did the Jewish and mainline Protestant institu-
tions. The one exception was the mainline Protestant child ser-
vice agencies that obtained larger proportions of their budgets
from public funding than did the conservative Protestant
agencies.
A more important question, given the pervasively sectarian
standard articulated by the Supreme Court, is what religiously-
based practices do the agencies receiving public funds engage in.
Especially relevant is the question of whether they engage in reli-
gious practices that would tend to permeate or color their entire
programming, or whether they engage in religious practices that
are separable and distinct from the rest of their programming.
One might understandably suppose, given the Supreme Court's
insistence on the pervasively sectarian standard in the case of K-
12 schools, that agencies receiving public funds, no matter what
their religious affiliation, would be marked by relatively few relig-
iously based practices and by ones that are separable from the
rest of their programming. Such was not the case. For each of
the three types of faith-based agencies, the questionnaire listed a
number of religiously based practices in which the organizations
might engage, and then asked them to indicate in which ones
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TABLE II
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS' RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
AND RECEIPT OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Percentage of Annual Budgets from Public Funds*
None Low Medium High Total N
Colleges/universities
Catholic 1% 43% 33% 23% 100% 82
Conservative Prot. 1% 22% 42% 35% 100% 74
Mainline Prot. 2% 37% 37% 25% 101% 63
Child service agencies
Jewish 38% 46% 17% 0% 101% 24
Catholic 5% 5% 24% 67% 101% 21
Conservative Prot. 27% 16% 18% 39% 100% 44
Mainline Prot. 5% 14% 23% 59% 101% 44
Internat'l aid agencies
Jewish 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 2
Catholic 0% 25% 0% 75% 100% 4
Conservative Prot. 25% 58% 0% 17% 100% 12
Mainline Prot. 50% 25% 8% 17% 100% 12
* In the case of the colleges and universities, low equals 1-9% of their budgets coming from public
funds, medium equals 10-19% of their budgets coming from public funds, and high equals 20% or
more coming from public funds. In the case of the child service agencies, low equals 1-19% of their
budgets coming from public funds, medium equals 20-59% coming from public funds, and high
equals 60% or more coming from public funds. In the case of the international aid agencies, low
equals 1-19% coming from public funds, medium equals 20-39% coming from public funds, and high
equals 40% or more coming from public funds.
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 73 (1996).
they, in fact, did engage. The results, broken down by religious
tradition, are given in Tables III, IV, and V. What is most striking
about these tables is the large number of religious practices in
which these organizations reported engaging. Also, they
reported engaging in many practices that, according to the con-
ceptualizations of pervasively sectarian put forward by Justices
Powell, Blackmun, and Brennan, could be construed to make
them "pervasively sectarian." Some 29 percent of the colleges
reported only hiring faculty in agreement with their religious ori-
entation, another 27 percent reported giving preference in hir-
ing faculty to those in agreement with their religious orientation,
59 percent encouraged faculty to integrate religious concepts
into their courses, 60 percent encouraged student religious com-
mitments, 29 percent of the colleges had mandatory chapel serv-
ices, and 18 percent either gave preference in admitting students
or only admitted students in agreement with their religious ori-
entation. These percentages were significantly higher for the
conservative Protestant colleges.
Similarly, among the child service agencies, a majority
reported having spoken prayers at meals and making informal
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TABLE III
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUSLY BASED COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES
Religious Practices
1) Spirit of service/love
2) A chapel on campus
3) Voluntary religious exercises
organized by the college or
university
4) Taking religion in account in
student behavior policies
5) Mandatory religion / theology
courses
6) Religious symbols / pictures on
campus
7) Voluntary chapel services
8) Encouraging student religious
commitments
9) Encourage faculty to integrate rel.
concepts & ideas into courses
10) Compulsory chapel services
11) Only hire faculty in agreement
with religious orientation
12) Give preference in hiring faculty
to those in agreement with rel.
orientation
13) Give preference in admitting
students to those in agreement
with rel. orientation
14) Compulsory religious exercises
org. by college or univ. (in
addition to compulsory chapel
services)
15) Admitting only students in


















































* Three institutions that fell in the "other" category in terms of religious tradition are included
in the fourth "All" column.
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 74 (1996).
references to religion by staff to their clients. One-third-and 73
percent among conservative Protestant agencies-reported
encouraging religious commitments by clients, and 44 percent
reported either hiring only persons in agreement with their reli-
gious orientation or giving preference to those in religious agree-
ment. The international relief agencies also reported similar
types of religiously based practices.
In order to analyze more exactly the relationship between
the receipt of public funds and the religious practices of faith-
based organizations, I developed the religious practices scale
(RPS), based on how many and in which religious practices the
organizations reported engaging. Those organizations with
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TABLE IV
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUSLY BASED CHILD
SERVICE AGENCIES
Religious Practice
1) Spirit of service/love
2) Voluntary religious
activities
3) Rel. symbols / pictures in
facilities
4) Informal references to
religious ideas by staff
with clients
5) Spoken prayers at meals
6) Required rel. activities
7) A paid chaplain on staff
8) Encourage religious
commitments by clients
9) Taking rel. into account
in making foster care or
adoption placements
10) Give preference in hiring
staff to those in agree.
with rel. orientation
11) Only hire staff in
agreement with rel.
orientation
12) A volunteer chaplain on
staff
13) Giving preference in
accepting clients to those














































36% 0% 2% 2% 9%
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 75 (1996).
more religious practices and with religious practices that would
tend to permeate the entire organization and all its services
would rank high on the scale; those with fewer religious practices
and with religious practices of a nature that would tend to be
separable from its other activities would rank low on the scale.22
In other words, the high RPS organizations would appear to at
least come close to meeting the Supreme Court's concept of per-
vasively sectarian. Table VI divides the organizations studied
based on their being secular or low, medium, or high on the RPS
and then reveals the percentage of their budget they reported
was attributable to government money. The religious-nonreli-
gious nature of the colleges and universities made almost no dif-
ference in the percentages of their budgets they received from
22. For details on this scale and how it was constructed see MONSMA, supra
note 18, Appendix C, at 225-28.
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TABLE V
RELIGIous PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUSLY BASED INTERNATIONAL
AID AGENCIES
Conservative Mainline
Jewish Catholic Protestant Protestant All*
Religious Practices (N=2) (N=4) (N=12) (N=12) (N=33)
1) Spirit of service / love 0% 75% 92% 100% 85%
2) Religious affiliation 100% 100% 83% 67% 79%
reflected in name or logo
3) Informal references to 0% 0% 58% 67% 52%
religious ideas by staff
with persons served
4) Voluntary rel. activities 0% 50% 58% 0% 30%
5) Give preference in hiring 0% 0% 33% 17% 24%
staff to those in agree.
with rel. orientation
6) Overt rel. activities by 50% 0% 33% 0% 21%
associated organization
7) Only hire staff in agree. 0% 0% 50% 8% 21%
with rel. orientation
8) Encourage religious 0% 25% 33% 8% 21%
commitments by persons
being served
9) Helping construct 50% 0% 25% 8% 15%
religious centers
* Three agencies that fell in the "other" category in terms of religious tradition are included in
the fourth, "All" column.
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 76 (1996).
the government. If anything, the high RPS colleges received
slightly more of their budgets from the government than did the
less religious institutions. Among the child service agencies, the
secular agencies received the most public money and the highly
religious agencies received the least. But even among the most
highly religious agencies, 28 percent received over 60 percent of
their budgets from the government (46 percent received over 20
percent of their budgets from the government). Among the
highly religious international aid agencies, 30 percent reported
receiving over 20 percent of their budgets from the government.
Table VII offers a summary picture of what the data show in
regard to the six criteria Justice Blackmun put forward in Roemer
as determining the pervasively sectarian character of an organiza-
tion and Justice Powell's summary description of a pervasively
sectarian organization in Hunt v. McNair. Significant minorities
of the organizations studied appear to be receiving public funds
even though they, at least in some respects, appear to possess
some characteristics of pervasively sectarian organizations. This
is particularly significant in that most of the faith-based organiza-
tions studied received many of their public funds directly, rather
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TABLE VI
THE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES SCALE AND RECEIPT OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Percentage of Annual Budgets from Public Funds*
None Low Medium High Total N
Colleges/universities
Presently secular** 2% 42% 29% 27% 100% 104
Low RPS 0% 44% 28% 28% 100% 36
Medium RPS 2% 34% 36% 29% 101% 103
High RPS 3% 28% 42% 27% 100% 86
Child Service Agencies
Presently secular** 4% 8% 14% 74% 100% 133
Low RPS 9% 31% 15% 44% 99% 32
Medium RPS 12% 11% 28% 49% 100% 65
High RPS 33% 23% 18% 28% 102% 40
Internat'l Aid Agencies
Presently secular** 36% 15% 13% 36% 100% 53
Low RPS 30% 40% 0% 30% 100% 20
High RPS 31% 39% 15% 15% 100% 13
* As is the case in Table II, for the colleges and universities, low equals 1-9% of their budgets
coming from public funds, medium equals 10-19% of their budgets coming from public funds,
and high equals 20% or more coming from public funds. For the child service agencies, low
equals 1-19% of their budgets coming from public funds, medium equals 20-59% coming from
public funds, and high equals 60% or more coming from public funds. For the international
aid agencies, low equals 1-19% coming from public funds, medium equals 20-39% coming from
public funds, and high equals 40% or more coming from public funds.
** Includes organizations that indicated they always have been secular or once were religious
but now are "largely secularly based."
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 78 (1996).
than indirectly by student or client choice. Some 90 percent of
the child service agencies that reported receiving public funds
reported receiving funds under purchase of service contracts.
The government-usually a unit of state or local government-
signs a contract in which it agrees to purchase certain child or
family services from the agency. Similarly, 87 percent of the
international aid agencies receiving public funds reported -they
received direct program grants. Eighty-three percent of the col-
leges and universities reported receiving public funds indirectly
by way of student scholarship grants, but 96 percent reporting
receiving work-study funds for students. Since these latter funds
go directly to the institutions who in turn distribute them to stu-
dents, they presumably would be considered a form of direct
funding.
What can one conclude from these data? And what do they
say in regard to church-state law as it applies to faith-based orga-
nizations and their partnership with government? In brief, I
believe they help demonstrate that the pervasively sectarian stan-
dard is an uncertain, wavering standard that does not serve us
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TABLE VII








1) Formal ties with a church unknown unknown unknown
2) Religious indoctrination common** 16% 25% 13%.
3) A lack of academic freedom none none none
4) A lack of normal academic standards none none none
5) Religion a factor in hiring*** 38% 49% 36%
6) Religion a factor in student / client 8% 18% unknown
admission****
7) If a substantial portion of functions 23%' 36% 39%
are subsumed in its religious
mission*****
* The first six characterizations are taken from Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roemer v. Maryland
Public Works Board, 426 U.S. at 736, 755-59 (1976), and the seventh is taken from Justice Powell's
summary description of a "pervasively sectarian" organization in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1972).
** The percentage of the religious organizations receiving public funds that, in the case of the
child service agencies and the colleges and universities, reported they encourage religious
commitments by their clients or students and have some required religious exercises; and, in the case
of the international aid agencies, reported they encourage religious commitments by their clients and
have some voluntary religious exercises.
*** The percentage of the religious organizations receiving public funds that reported they either
only hire staff in agreement with their religious orientation or give preference in hiring to those in
agreement with their religious orientation.
**** In the case of child service agencies the percentage of agencies receiving public funds that
reported they give preference in accepting clients to those in agreement with their religious
orientation, and in the case of colleges and universities the percentage of institutions receiving public
funds that reported they only accept students in agreement with their religious orientation or give
preference in accepting students to those in agreement with their religious orientation.
***** The percentages of the religious organizations receiving public funds that rank high on the
Religious Practices Scale.
Source: STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix 123 (1996).
well. In light of the previously cited attempts to define perva-
sively sectarian and to distinguish pervasively sectarian from non-
sectarian organizations, it is noteworthy that the picture of many
of the faith-based colleges, child service agencies, and interna-
tional aid agencies included in my study is a picture of organiza-
tions that have prayer and other religious observances as a
regular part of their activities, take religion into account in hir-
ing staff, and sometimes-in the case of colleges- -in admitting
students, seek to integrate religious ideas and concepts into the
services they provide, encourage religious commitments by those
they serve, and frequently have religious symbols in their facili-
ties. Table VI shows that 97 percent of the colleges ranking high
on the religious practices scale receive some public funding, as
do two-thirds of the child services agencies ranking high on the
same scale, and 69 percent of the international aid agencies.
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Table VII is especially instructive on this score. Justice Black-
mun suggested the existence of "religious indoctrination" would
in part be signaled by the presence of required religious exer-
cises."a This table reveals that significant minorities of the faith-
based organizations receiving public funding practice "religious
indoctrination" as thus conceived by Blackmun. From 15 to 25
percent of the faith-based organizations receiving public funds
indicated they seek to affect the religious views of those receiving
their services and have certain required religious exercises (or
voluntary religious exercises in the case of international aid
agencies).
Significant minorities of the religious institutions and agen-
cies that receive public funds, and almost a majority of the col-
leges and universities, take religion into account in hiring their
professional staff members, or,. to put it into the lower courts'
pejorative terms quoted by Blackmun, "stack" their staffs "with
members of a particular group."24 Religion is a factor in admit-
ting students in only a small percentage of the religious colleges
and in religious child service agencies accepting clients, although
even here almost one in five of the religiously based colleges that
receive government funds give preference in admitting students
to persons from their own religious tradition.
This means that when one gives a broad definition to perva-
sively sectarian, many seemingly pervasively sectarian organiza-
tions are receiving public funding; when one gives a narrow
definition to pervasively sectarian, it is hard to make the case that
most K-12 faith-based schools are pervasively sectarian. There is
a dilemma here that the courts and scholars of constitutional law
need to face up to. The pervasively sectarian standard is neither
well-defined nor consistently applied. That these are -not merely
theoretical questions with little practical policy import is illus-
trated by a recent court case that arose in Maryland. The next
section of this paper explores that case.
III. COLUMBA UNTION COLLEGE V. CLARKE
Maryland's Sellinger program provides state-funded grants
to private colleges, with the funding amount based on the
number of full-time students in attendance at the colleges quali-
fying under the terms of the program.25 In 1990, Columbia
Union College-a Seventh Day Adventist College in Takoma
23. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 735, 755 (1976).
24. Id. at 757.
25. The following information is taken from Columbia Union College v.
Clarke, 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Park, Maryland-applied for funds under the Sellinger program
and was turned down by the state because it was held to be perva-
sively sectarian. Maryland ruled that, because of its pervasively
sectarian nature, granting it funding would violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.26 Its pervasively sectarian
nature was revealed by the fact that it was not institutionally
autonomous "from the Seventh Day Adventist Church, it
required religious worship by its students, its religion department
sought to 'set the tone' for college life, religion influenced non-
theology courses, and a large percentage of the students and
faculty were church members. "2 Thus Maryland concluded that
"the college's religious mission permeated even its assertedly sec-
ular educational functions."28 Following the Supreme Court's
Rosenberger decision, the college requested that Maryland recon-
sider its earlier decision, but in 1996 was again turned down.
The college brought action in federal District Court. The Dis-
trict Court held for the state, and the college appealed to the
Court of Appeals. In a split 2-1 decision the court rejected the
college's reasoning under the Rosenberger decision. It concluded
the Roemer precedent was binding in this case and that Roemer
teaches "that when a college is so pervasively sectarian that its
religious mission 'permeates' its educational functions, the gov-
ernment cannot provide direct money grants even to fund the
college's secular subjects because 'religious and secular functions
[are] inseparable."' 29 The court then went on to hold, however,
there was insufficient evidence in the record to rule on whether
or not Columbia Union College is in fact pervasively sectarian,
and therefore remanded the case back to the District Court to
develop a more complete record on the pervasively sectarian
nature of the college. 0 The minority opinion opined that there
was sufficient evidence to rule the college was pervasively sectar-
ian and stated that it would have held for the state of Maryland.31
Especially helpful for our purposes here is the able dissent
written by Chief Judge Wilkinson. He begins by concluding that
"Maryland has thus denied funding to Columbia Union College
for one reason only-its sectarian character. By denying Colum-
bia Union funding on the basis of its sectarian approach to edu-
cation, Maryland has impermissibly discriminated against the
26. See id. at 154.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 161 (quoting Roemer, 426 U.S. at 750).
30. See id. at 169.
31. See id. at 170, 177.
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college on the basis of its religious point of view."'3 2 Judge Wil-
kinson goes on to discuss the neutrality principle as seen in such
cases as Witters, Zobrest, Rosenberger, and Agostini, and concludes:
Just as all private institutions should be treated neutrally,
so should all religious viewpoints be treated similarly.
Maryland's program now does neither of these things.
Because the Sellinger Program violates the Supreme
Court's recent neutrality principle in two respects, I would
unhesitatingly find Columbia Union's pervasively sectarian
character irrelevant and reverse the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
33
But then he goes on to state that the Supreme Court's "funding
prohibition principle is hanging on, if only by its fingernails,"
34
and thus that he felt duty-bound to follow Supreme Court prece-
dent and rule that since Columbia Union is pervasively sectarian
it is ineligible for direct funding from the state.
This case speaks eloquently-even if depressingly-to the
basic thesis of this essay: that the pervasively sectarian standard in
practice is an uncertain, arbitrary one. The majority, for exam-
ple, argues that because in practice only about one-half the stu-
dent body is required to attend weekly chapel services, Columbia
Union may in fact not be pervasively sectarian. 35 It further
argues that while the overwhelming majority of full-time faculty
are Seventh Day Adventist, many of the adjunct faculty are not.
36
What does this say about its pervasively sectarian nature? This
leads Judge Wilkinson to note in his opinion that there are three
Catholic colleges that receive funding under the Sellinger pro-
gram and to raise the question of at what point might they be
held to be pervasively sectarian:
For example, Mount Saint Mary's appoints the Archbishop
of Baltimore as an automatic trustee and requires that'at
least one-fourth of its trustees, including the Archbishop,
be ordained priests. Notre Dame requires that just under
one-third of its trustees be nuns. And Loyola's president
must be a member of the Society of Jesus. May Mount
Saint Mary's raise its requirement to one-half? May Notre
Dame increase its to more than one-third? May Loyola
include the same prerequisite in its search for a vice presi-
dent? How are these colleges to know? It will be impossi-
32. Id. at 170 (WilkinsonJ., dissenting).
33. Id. at 172.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 164.
36. See id. at 166.
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ble for them to predict at what point sectarian influences
of this type will tip the scales.3 7
The conclusion concerning the uncertain nature of the perva-
sively sectarian standard that is documented and highlighted by
my study is placed in specific, concrete terms by this case.
IV. NEUTRALITY VS. THE No-DIRECT-FUNDING/PERVASIVELY
SECTARIAN STANDARD
One way in which the uncertain nature of the pervasively
sectarian standard could be resolved would be for the courts to
continue to insist on the no-direct-funding principle and to
adopt a strict, broad definition of pervasively sectarian. Many
current programs and the long American tradition of partner-
ship between governmental units and faith-based educational,
health, and social service organizations would thereby be ended,
and the rapidly developing reemphasis on that partnership
would be cut short, but conceptual and legal clarity would be
attained. Most would judge that is too high a price to pay. Some
of the neediest among us would find their needs unmet, and gov-
ernmental bureaucracies would have to expand to meet those
needs.
More importantly, there is also a religious freedom, or fair-
ness, issue at stake. In its famous 1947 decision in Everson v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court called for governmental
neutrality on matters of religion." "[T] he state [is] to be a neu-
tral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers .... State power is no more to be used as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them."3 9 It has reiterated this call
many times over the past fifty years. For government to create a
program of assistance to a particular type of social service agency,
and then to say that assistance is available to secular agencies or
to faith-based agencies that have reduced their faith commitment
to a few, carefully segregated practices, but is not available to
other faith-based agencies whose religious beliefs have led them
to take a more holistic approach to providing social services, is to
be anything but neutral. It is to favor the secular and one type of
religious approach to another type of religious approach.4 ° This
is to discriminate against religion.
37. Id. at 176.
38. 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
39. Id. at 18.
40. I and others have sought to make this point at length elsewhere, so I
will not develop this point as fully here as it could be developed. See STEPHEN V.
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Judge Wilkinson in the Columbia Union case clearly makes
the point that to the extent that there continue to be attempts to
follow the pervasively sectarian standard as a means to deny aid
or to threaten to deny aid to faith-based service organizations,
governmental neutrality towards religion is violated.
Despite the fact that it has met all neutral criteria for state
aid, and despite the fact that other religious institutions
are receiving funding, Columbia Union has yet to receive
so much as a penny in state assistance. The only way it
could receive such aid is by compromising or abandoning
its religious views. That to me is impermissible inhibition
of religion, impermissible discrimination under our Con-
stitution's religion clauses, and a violation of the First
Amendment right to express religious beliefs. 'That
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and non-believers;
it does not require the state to be their adversary.' The
Supreme Court in its recent enunciation of the neutrality
principle has affirmed as much. But... the Court has not
expressly overruled the funding prohibition principle in its
First Amendment jurisprudence .... "
In short, not only is the pervasively sectarian standard an uncer-
tain, arbitrary standard, it is also-if it were ever strictly fol-
lowed-one that would support practices that discriminate
against faith-based organizations as compared to their secular
counterparts that are offering similar or parallel services.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I believe the results of my study, as well as the concrete
instance of Columbia Union College and its discriminatory treat-
ment by the state of Maryland, indicate that the no-direct-fund-
ing principle and the pervasively sectarian principle to which it is
linked form a weak basis for First Amendment interpretation.
There are no good constitutional reasons why the neutrality prin-
ciple the Supreme Court has developed to deal with questions of
indirect funding should not also be applied to questions of direct
funding. The distinction is one of form, not substance. In both
cases money is flowing from public coffers to private, faith-based
organizations; in both cases no money is going to support faith-
based groups in their remembrance and celebration of their core
MONSMA, PosrrvE NEurnAxrrY 40-51, 245-47 (1993); MONSMA, supra note 18, at
111-27.
41. Columbia Union, 159 F.3d at 177 (quoting Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)) (citation omitted).
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religious beliefs, but only to support services that non-religious
organizations are also -providing and that policy makers have
judged to be of public benefit to society at large. There may be
prudential public policy reasons why indirect forms of govern-
ment funding of public services by private organizations-
whether or not faith-based-are preferable to direct ones, but
that is different than saying there are legal, First Amendment rea-
sons for holding one constitutional and other not.
While awaiting court rulings removing the distinction
between direct and indirect forms of public funding of health,
educational, and social services, policy makers can reshape direct
aid programs to make them into programs of indirect assistance.
Maryland, for example, could recast its Sellinger program into a
voucher-type program with the per student subsidy going to indi-
vidual students who then sign them over to whatever private col-
lege they choose to attend. It thereby would operate more like
the old GI Bill program or the current Pell grant program. Simi-
larly, what are now purchase of service contracts-in which a
state or locality purchases certain services from a faith-based
health or social service agency-could be turned into voucher-
type programs, with the funds being attached to the persons in
need of services and those funds going to the agencies those per-
sons select.
But there are limits to the extent to which current direct aid
programs can be transferred into indirect aid programs, espe-
cially when the persons receiving the funds are especially young
or for other reasons are unable to make their own choice of pro-
vider. The very fact, however, that most direct aid programs can
be easily turned into indirect aid programs suggest that the
direct-indirect distinction is more form than substance. Thus the
preferred way to go is for the Supreme Court to abandon its stan-
dard of no direct funding of pervasively sectarian organizations,
and substitute a neutrality standard.42 Then the way will be
opened for a host of new public policy initiatives, featuring active
partnerships between governmental units and faith-based educa-
tional, health, and social service organizations. In so doing, the
greater flexibility, more personal touch, and faith-based motiva-
42. It is important to note that the neutrality for which I am calling is not
a formal or legal neutrality, but a substantive or positive neutrality. See MONSMA,
supra note 18, at ch. 6; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Stephen V. Monsma,
Substantive Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No Establishment Common
Ground (1998) (paper prepared for delivery at the 1998 annual meeting of
American Political Science Association, Boston, Sept. 3-6, 1998) (on file with
author).
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tions of the religious agencies will be more fully brought to bear
on persistent social ills, and they will be able to do so without
having to abandon or water-down the very faith dimension that
often makes their programs so very effective. The American peo-
ple-and especially those who are the most needy among us-
will be the greatest beneficiaries.
